Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical formalisation of the joint-venture contract, as an alternative to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), within a Dissipation of Intangible Assets framework. In a two-period, two-country equilibrium model, we discuss how the threat of knowledge spillover shapes the boundaries of a Multinational Enterprise. Similarly to the theoretical findings on the FDI-licensing trade off, we show that Foreign Direct Investment is more likely to emerge when know-how easily spills over – i.e. when firms are endowed with more intangible assets or they belong to high tech industries. Probit estimates, from an entirely new firm-level dataset, constructed by the author, show that the experience of Italian multinationals in Asia is in line with our theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Intangible Assets, Internalisation, FDI, joint-venture, Asia

JEL: F23, C25, O5

1. Introduction
During the last few decades, firms have increasingly committed themselves to global markets. This has coincided with a surge of activities by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), as measured by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)1; indeed FDI flows have grown much faster than trade and income until 2001, when this figure reversed and FDI started to slow down (UNCTAD 2004).

Globalisation has underlined the need for firms to exploit their Intangible Assets (IAs) on a global scale. IAs may consist either in a stock of goodwill – associated with product quality reputation – or in

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1 Throughout the paper, we use the term MNE in a broad sense, calling “multinational” a firm that is servicing a foreign market, not necessarily through Foreign Direct Investment.
superior *knowledge* – related, for instance, to an idea, a good customer relationship, a new tool, or superior management techniques.

That Multinational Enterprises must necessarily transfer some levels of their Intangible Assets, while operating abroad, is close to definitional: an attempt to exploit promising opportunities means a decision concerning the nature of those assets and the methods by which they are to be transferred (Blair and Freeman 2004). Evidence shows that an industry tends to have a greater proportion of MNEs when its output is characterized by high R&D, marketing expenditures, scientific and technical workers, product innovation and complexity (Markusen 1995). Compared to physical assets, IAs are more likely to give rise to FDI firstly because they can be easily transferred back and forth and secondly because they enjoy a “public good” nature, which makes them available to additional production facilities at relatively low costs. Notice that the same joint-ness features that enable MNEs to cheaply move Intangible Assets expose them to the risk of *dissipation*.

Given the great importance of IAs in orienting multinational activity, what are the best ways for MNEs to achieve their goals? The choice of the most appropriate ownership structure is a central issue in economic theory and a very practical question for firms wishing to operate abroad.

Broadly speaking, we should recognize the existence of different ways of servicing a foreign market – from export to FDI, from joint-venture (JV) to licensing – which can be classified according to their knowledge transfer, from the safest arrangement of export, that secures knowledge inside the firm and the country where it originates, to the most risky case of licensing, through which knowledge is transferred both outside the source firm and the source country. Foreign Direct Investment and joint-venture represent two intermediate steps in this continuum, the former having knowledge inside the source firm but transferred outside the source country, the latter being characterized by the Multinational participating in final good production together with a local partner.

We call *Internalisation issue* the decision regarding firm’s boundaries, namely the choice of whether to internalise or to outsource certain activities (Dunning 1993). Internalising typically brings direct cost penalties, because an independent supplier might have better knowledge, expertise and cost advantage, with respect to an integrated firm; however, relying on the market might be risky as well, due to technology transfer (see, among others: Teece 1977, 1986, Rugman 1986), informational asymmetries (Ethier 1986), moral hazard

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2 *Dissipation*, in this framework, entails a different meaning, depending on the asset under consideration: in the case of *knowledge*, a spillover mechanism is likely to operate, making the local counterpart appropriate production secrets, copy final goods and eventually start a rival firm on the basis of the “stolen” asset; in the case of *reputation*, dissipation comes because the local counterpart benefits form the MNE’s brand image, but puts no effort in maintaining and enhancing it.
(Rugman 1985, 1986, Horstmann and Markusen 1996), and reputation concerns (Horstmann and Markusen 1987b). Therefore, the boundaries of the firm – both domestically and abroad – are shaped by the trade off between the costs and the benefits of using the market (Coase 1937; Williamson 1985).

While many authors mention the joint-venture across the wide array of feasible contracts in a foreign country (see, for instance: Teece 1977, Mansfield et al. 1979; Rugman 1985, 1986; Saggi 2000; Ramachandran 1993; Glass and Saggi 1999, 2002a), to the best of our knowledge, no theoretical formalisation has been offered yet, in assessing the Internalisation issue.

International JVs offer the possibility to make profitable use of the specific capabilities of the local partner; they may facilitate cooperation with foreign governments, and generate knowledge that could be valuable in future business operations (Desai et al. 2002). However, these advantages are often offset by the implicit costs of split ownership, and the resulting inability to fully exploit certain resources developed by the parent firm: the risk of being expropriated is always inherent in such an alliance because proximity to Intangible Assets enables the local company to expropriate the MNE’s key resource and start a rival firm.

While abstracting from any reputation consideration, we are interested in the exact role that dissipation of knowledge – in the form of technology and human capital - plays in orienting the MNE decision of FDI versus partnering; in particular, we aim at showing that the integrated solution becomes more appealing the stronger the threat of spillover, resembling the FDI-licensing trade off, extensively documented in the literature (Ethier and Markusen 1996; Markusen 1998, 2001; Saggi 1996, 1999; Fosfuri 2000; Mattoo et al. 2001; Fosfuri et al. 2001; Glass and Saggi 2002a). In a partial equilibrium framework similar to (Ethier and Markusen 1996; Saggi 1999; Mattoo et al. 2001), we consider a Multinational Enterprise willing to produce in a foreign market. The MNE has to decide between two alternative entry modes: Foreign Direct Investment, by which production takes place within a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) or joint-venture with a local company, which is potentially appealing due to the partners’ complementary skills. By assumption, FDI avoids knowledge dissipation, but involves efficiency losses, since the local company has a relative advantage in input manufacturing, relative to the MNE; contrary, JV is efficiency enhancing, but firms retain only a share of total revenues and knowledge is subject to dissipation which prompts production efficiency. The market structure is endogenized in a two-period, two-country model where competition in the local country results from a Cournot game in case of FDI and a monopoly in case of JV. We find that the joint-venture is always preferable, for the multinational, when the first period share $\theta$, imposed by the local government, is large, due to the MNE’s considerable stake in the

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3 Access, in the Rajan and Zingales (2001)’s terminology.
partnership. Contrary, FDI always emerges, as an equilibrium outcome, for low values of $\theta$ since the benefit of production efficiency is more than outweighed by the low fraction of the revenues accruing to the MNE. The threat of Intangible Assets dissipation comes at play for intermediate values of the first period share: we find that FDI prevails when the spillover effect is strong, while JV is chosen when the spillover effect is so mild that it is completely outweighed by production efficiency considerations. Welfare implications of Foreign Direct Investment and joint-venture are derived at the end.

Theoretical priors on the boundaries of the MNE – FDI versus JV - are tested in the second part of the paper, by means of a new firm-level dataset, constructed by the author. The empirical analysis builds on a survey questionnaire exploring the international choices of more than 300 Italian manufacturing companies (90% of the total) with production affiliates in a region of the world that we call Asia, including China, India and the South East Asian (SEA) countries - Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Philippines, South Korea and Japan. The questionnaire, structured in multiple choice responses, enabled us to derive detailed information not only on traditional variables – such as sales, employees etc. – but also on more subtle aspects referred to MNEs’ Intangible Assets – such as the employees human capital and the firm international experience – rarely considered in previous studies due to the lack of firm-level data. Probit estimates on the Italian choice of FDI versus JV in Asia match with our model predictions.

This paper relates to several strands of literature. The choice of the topic and the specific modelling moves our analysis close to the theories of the Internalisation issue based on the Dissipation of Intangible Assets (DIA), where the risk of losing any of the firm’s key resources provides a motive for keeping production internal rather than relying on the market.\(^4\) In Horstmann and Markusen (1987b), exporting, setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary and licensing are compared as alternative entry modes for a Multinational Enterprise, renowned for its product quality. In this framework, any licensing contract must provide the licensee with the adequate incentives to enhance the Multinational’s reputation: when providing incentives of this sort becomes too costly, the foreign firm decides to internalise production. In (Ethier and Markusen 1996; Markusen 1998, 2001; Saggi 1996, 1999; Fosfuri 2000; Mattoo et al. 2001; Fosfuri et al. 2001; Glass and Saggi 2002a) the dissipation of knowledge offers a major rational for operating in wholly owned subsidiaries, rather than signing a licensing agreement. In this case the entry mode decision is driven by the extent of a spillover mechanism that might enable the local party to appropriate production secrets, and

\(^4\) Building on Dunning (1993)’s OLI paradigm, theories of the boundaries of the Multinational Enterprise have fruitfully developed along three directions, called: Theories of the Firm, Agency Costs, Dissipation of Intangible Assets (See Markusen 1995; Saggi 2000; Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004; Gattai 2005 for surveys). For the purpose of the present work, we focus solely on the DIA approach.
start a rival firm: the more serious this threat, the more likely the integrated solution. Differently from this literature, we model the choice of FDI versus joint-venture - instead of licensing – based on knowledge dissipation.

Our focus on human capital and technology - as key assets that a Multinational Enterprise may wish to exploit in its foreign operations - brings this paper close to the studies on knowledge transfer costs (see Caves 1974; Teece 1977, 1986; Davidson and Mc Fetridge 1984; Ramachandran 1993; Glass and Saggi 1999). Authors belonging to this field assume that modern economic growth is inextricably linked to the successful international transfer of technology, the extent of which crucially hinges on the costs involved. Transfer costs are shown to depend on a number of transferor’s and transferee’s characteristics, such as the number of previous applications and the age of the technology, the manufacturing experience and the sales of the recipient party etc. Our contribution differs from these in two aspects: first of all, we take the point of view of the MNE, and consider knowledge dissipation as a negative aspect, while it is regarded as a source of growth in (Caves 1974; Teece 1977, 1986; Davidson and Mc Fetridge 1984; Ramachandran 1993; Glass and Saggi 1999); moreover, technology transfer is not the ultimate focus of our research, but rather one of the factors that eventually influence the entry mode decision of Multinational Enterprises.

The great importance of Intangible Assets and their influence on the most appropriate organisational form is also at the hart of a relatively recent strand in the Theory of the Firm. Indeed, Rajan and Zingales (1998; 2000; 2001), offer an interesting re-thinking of the concept of power, which no longer stems from ownership of physical assets – as in the Property Right Approach (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990) - but rather on access to critical resources. While adopting a similar perspective on the role of IAs in driving the international organisational decision, we are more interested in the FDI-JV trade off, than in the choice between horizontal and vertical hierarchies.

Finally, our contribution relates to the empirical literature on the choice between WOS and JV, where the Internalisation decision is explained in terms of firm, industry, and country characteristics in discrete dependent variable-models (see, among others: Andersen and Gatignon 1986; Gomes Casseres 1989; Hennart 1991; Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992; Erramilli 1996; Buckley and Casson 1996; Smarzynska 2000; Desai et al. 2002; Pan 2002; Chen and Hu 2002; Herrmann and Datta 2002; Brouthers 2002; Guillen 2003). While these papers ground on Coase (1937)’s and Williamson (1985)’s intuitions and qualitatively extend some DIA arguments to the case of joint-venture, the present contribution is intended to provide a theoretical formalisation of the JV option, and show that a DIA mechanism - similar to the one highlighted for the FDI-licensing choice – also drives the FDI-JV trade off. Moreover, an additional element of novelty comes from the dataset employed here and our
attempt at measuring human capital aspects beyond the broadly documented technological ones.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model, with particular attention to the entry mode decision – FDI versus JV (2.1) – and the welfare implications of these two arrangements (2.2); Section 3 is entirely devoted to the empirical analysis – data description (3.1), methodology (3.2) and Probit estimates (3.3); Section 4 concludes and sets the future agenda.

2. The model
In this Section, we present the theoretical model on the MNE’s choice of FDI or joint-venture (2.1) and discuss the welfare implications of the two contractual agreements (2.2). All the main derivations are included in Appendix A.

2.1 The entry mode choice: FDI versus JV
In a partial equilibrium framework similar to (Ethier and Markusen 1996; Saggi 1999; Mattoo et al. 2001), consider a two-country - North (N) and South (S) - two-period -1 and 2 - model in which a multinational firm, located in the North, is willing to produce a final good in the South. The S market is populated by a single firm, which acts as a monopolist, and sells the same good as the MNE in N; the Multinational Enterprise has to decide whether to serve the foreign market through FDI or in joint-venture with the local firm; moreover, it is not possible for the MNE to change supply mode between the first and the second period5.

Final good production requires two activities: input manufacturing and assembling, according to a linear technology which employs 1 unit of input to obtain 1 unit of output.

Notice that these steps can be performed either by the multinational (through its subsidiary) or by the local enterprise, but the two firms are not equally efficient, since the MNE has an advantage in processing final goods – due to its superior knowledge - while the other party does better in input manufacturing6.

To capture this idea, we assume that the per unit cost of each activity is zero, if it is performed by the company that has a relative advantage in it, and $\alpha (\alpha > 0)$ otherwise.

As in (Ethier and Markusen 1996; Saggi 1999; Markusen 1998, 2001; Mattoo et al. 2001) demand is linear in the S market; in particular:

$$p = 1 - Q$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

5 This option is instead considered in Markusen (1998, 2001), where the MNE can choose a different licensee in the second period.
6 This assumption fits the Italian experience in Asia, presented in Section 3. Empirical evidence shows that Italian multinationals tend to contribute know-how and technology while relying on their local partner for input supply.
where p is the price and Q denotes the total quantity, $Q = q_{MNE} + q_{local}$: MNE and local stand for the multinational and the local firm respectively.

As in Fosfuri (2000), we assume that firms attach equal weight to every period, i.e. the discount factor is equal to 1.

Operating through Foreign Direct Investment means that the Multinational Enterprise keeps production within its boundaries, through a local subsidiary; in this case it is the same firm that performs both input manufacturing and assembly. So, competition in the S market results in a symmetric Cournot game, with marginal (and average) cost equal to $\alpha$.

The essence of a joint-venture agreement lays, instead, in the partners’ complementary skills\(^7\): in this case, each party performs only the activity in which it has a relative advantage, and sales revenues are shared with weights $\theta$ ($0<\theta<1$) for the MNE and $(1-\theta)$ for the local firm, in the first period, and $\bar{\theta}$ ($0<\bar{\theta}<1$), $(1-\bar{\theta})$ in the second period. To capture the restrictions that many developing countries governments put to foreign ownership\(^9\), we treat $\theta$ as an exogenous parameter, while the MNE is free to choose $\bar{\theta}$ in the second period. Put another way, the Multinational Enterprise has two alternatives in entering the S market: FDI and JV, the latter involving the additional choice of the second period share. If a joint-venture contract is signed, market S becomes a monopoly, and final good production rests with the joint-venture.

Consider, first, the FDI case. Equation (2) gives the present value of the MNE profit when final good production is internalised (See Appendix A for details):

$$\Pi^{FDI}_{MNE} = \frac{2}{9}(1-\alpha)^2$$

By operating on its own, the Multinational Enterprise benefits from keeping entire revenues in both periods, but it entails higher costs in input manufacturing, compared to the local company.

\(^7\) Given this functional form, $0<\alpha<1$.

\(^8\) Our modelling of the joint-venture contract is quite close to Ramachandran (1993), Mattoo et al. (2001), Glass and Saggi (2002a). Notice that the FDI/joint-venture decision does not necessarily coincide with the Greenfield/Acquisition one. In particular joint-ventures differ from Acquisitions because the local firm is not “bought” by the MNE, and the two enterprises do not “merge” into a new economic entity: they simply make a temporary cooperation agreement in order to produce final goods together. This is the reason why the local partner may deviate in the second period and eventually start a rival firm, as it is explained below, in Section 2.

\(^9\) This is true for many DVCs, and for the large majority of the Asian countries in our sample (for more details, see: www.ice.it, www.indmin.nic.in). Moreover, according to the Italian experience in Asia - surveyed in this paper - it is not uncommon for joint-venture contract to set different shares across time.
Consider now the present value of the two firms’ profits under the JV agreement - namely $\Pi_{MNE}^{JV}$ for the MNE and $\Pi_{local}^{JV}$ for the local firm (See Appendix A for details):

$$\Pi_{MNE}^{JV} = \frac{\theta + \bar{\theta}}{4}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

$$\Pi_{local}^{JV} = \frac{(1 - \theta) + (1 - \bar{\theta})}{4}$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

In this case, production efficiency is achieved, but each firm retains just a fraction of total revenue.

Operating in joint-venture, the two sides work very close to each other; this might generate a knowledge spillover from the MNE to the local firm during the first period: having access\(^{10}\) to the multinational Intangible Assets – human capital and technology - the partner might learn about the processing procedure so that her cost disadvantage $\alpha$ drops to a lower level $c\alpha$ in the second period, with $0 < c < 1$\(^{11}\).

According to our modelling, $c$ measures the extent of the spillover effect, lower values being associated with higher degrees of knowledge dissipation.

It follows that the local firm has the option of breaking up the JV contract, and start a rival firm, with the “stolen” know-how; such an option does not exist for the Multinational Enterprise, this asymmetry depending on the fact that the it has just a poor knowledge of the local market, relative to the partner\(^{12}\).

In case of defection – denoted by superscript $d$ - the local firm makes a profit (See Appendix A for details):

$$\Pi_{local}^{d} = \frac{(1 - \theta) + (1 - c\alpha)^2}{4}$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

while the multinational, having no other option, earns zero.

It is clear that the MNE can prevent this defection by setting $\bar{\theta}$ such that the local firm’s second period profit, under the JV agreement, is not lower that its profit in starting a rival firm, i.e.:

\(^{10}\) Although licensing provides a more direct channel for technology transfer - because the licensor has to provide the licensee with the whole set of production tools – working side by side in a joint-venture similarly allows the local firm to learn from the MNE.

\(^{11}\) Notice that $c$ is strictly greater than zero, meaning that the cost reduction, induced by knowledge dissipation, cannot make the local firm exactly as efficient as the MNE in processing final goods. At the same time $c$ is strictly lower than 1, meaning that a spillover mechanism – although very weak, if $c \to 1$ - is always at work in the joint-venture.

\(^{12}\) In other DIA papers, this asymmetry is captured by a fixed cost incurred by the MNE in operating alone in the local market (see, for instance: Ethier and Markusen 1996; Saggi 1996; Fosfuri 2000; Fosfuri at al. 2001).
\[
\frac{1-\bar{\theta}}{4} \geq \frac{(1-c\alpha)^2}{4}
\]  
(6)

This is the Incentive Compatibility Constraint, which yields the following condition:

\[
\bar{\theta} \leq 1-(1-c\alpha)^2
\]  
(7)

The multinational chooses to integrate, rather than partnering if \(\Pi_{MNE}^{FDI}\) from (2) is greater than \(\Pi_{MNE}^{JV}\) from (3), evaluated at the incentive compatible value of the second period share:

\[
\bar{\theta} = 1-(1-c\alpha)^2
\]  
(8)

By evaluating \(\Pi_{MNE}^{FDI} > \Pi_{MNE}^{JV}\) at (8) we obtain:

\[
\frac{2}{9}(1-\alpha)^2 > \frac{\theta}{4} + \left[1-(1-c\alpha)^2\right] \frac{1}{4}
\]  
(9)

Equation (9) gives the condition for the multinational to internalise, and it is solved in Result 1.

**Result 1** (See Appendix A for details)

Condition (9) is verified - i.e. \(\Pi_{MNE}^{FDI} > \Pi_{MNE}^{JV}\) - when

\[
c > c_2 = \frac{1 + \sqrt{\frac{9\theta + 9 - 8(1-\alpha)^2}{9}}}{\alpha} \quad \text{or} \quad c < c_1 = \frac{1 - \sqrt{\frac{9\theta + 9 - 8(1-\alpha)^2}{9}}}{\alpha}
\]

In choosing between FDI and JV, the MNE trades off the benefit of retaining total revenues and protecting its Intangible Assets, with the efficiency loss in terms of input manufacturing. Such a trade off crucially drives Result 2:

**Result 2** (See Appendix A for details)

\(i\) If \(\theta < F(\alpha) = \frac{17(1-\alpha)^2 - 9}{9}\), the Multinational Enterprise will always choose Foreign Direct Investment;

\(ii\) If \(F(\alpha) < \theta < G(\alpha) = \frac{8(1-\alpha)^2}{9}\), both arrangements may emerge, depending on the extent of the spillover effect, captured by \(c\): if
\[
0 < c < c_1 = \sqrt[3]{\frac{9\theta + 9 - 8(1 - \alpha)^2}{9 \alpha}} \quad (i.e. \ strong \ spillover \ effect), \text{ the MNE will choose FDI to avoid knowledge dissipation; if } c_1 < c < 1 \ (i.e. \ weak \ spillover \ effect) \ JV \ will \ emerge \ as \ an \ equilibrium \ outcome; \text{ the MNE’s profit gap, between FDI and joint-venture, increases as long as } c \ decreases (i.e. \ stronger \ spillover \ effect); \\
iii) \text{ If } \theta > G(\alpha), \text{ the MNE will always choose joint-venture;}
\]
iv) \text{ If } 1 - \frac{3}{\sqrt{17}} = \alpha_1 < \alpha < 1, \text{ case i) never occurs.}

From Result 2, it is clear that the JV option is never appealing if the first period share, imposed by the local government, is lower than a threshold \(F(\alpha)\) (case i): in this case, the benefit of production efficiency is more than outweighed by the low fraction of the revenues accruing to the MNE. The risk of dissipating knowledge plays no role under these circumstances, because FDI is per se attractive compared to a partnership in which the foreign firm has just a small stake. Opposite to this is the situation in which \(\theta\) is greater than a threshold \(G(\alpha)\) (case iii) since the MNE’s large stake in the partnership makes the joint-venture absolutely appealing from the point of view of Multinational Enterprise, despite the spillover mechanism that benefits the local partner.

The threat of Intangible Assets dissipation comes at play for intermediate values of the first period share accruing to the foreign firm (case ii): when \(F(\alpha) < \theta < G(\alpha), \theta\) is not large or small enough to drive the MNE’s entry mode decision per se: here we see that FDI prevails for lower values of \(c\) (i.e. higher cost reduction for the local firm, induced by knowledge dissipation), while JV emerges, as an equilibrium outcome, for higher values of \(c\) (here the spillover effect is so mild that it is completely outweighed by production efficiency considerations). Moreover, the profit gap for the MNE, between operating alone (FDI) or in joint-venture, increases as long as \(c\) decreases, in lines with the empirical evidence of Mansfield et al. (1979), Mansfield and Romeo (1980).

Therefore, we conclude that FDI, induced by the threat of knowledge dissipation, is more likely to emerge over JV when know-how easily spills over, namely for firms endowed with superior knowledge or operating in high tech industries.

Notice that these priors are broadly consistent with those derived for licensing (see Section 1) and they match with the empirical evidence on the choice between joint-venture and FDI provided by (Andersen and Gatignon 1986; Gomes Casseres 1989; Hennart 1991; Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992; Erramilli 1996; Buckley and Casson 1996; Smarzynska 2000; Desai et al. 2002, to mention just a few).
2.2 Welfare implications

In Section (2.1) we derived the conditions for the Multinational Enterprise to internalise production, rather than signing a joint-venture agreement with a local firm (See Result 2). Now we want to see what the welfare implications of the two contractual agreements are.

Suppose that all the agents – producers and consumers – discount the future the same (i.e. also consumers put equal weights to every period, according to our assumption in Section 2.1)

First consider the FDI case. Total discounted welfare $W_{FDI}$ is given by the sum of the two firms’ discounted profits and consumer discounted surplus, namely $W_{FDI} = \Pi_{MNE}^{FDI} + \Pi_{local}^{FDI} + CS^{FDI}$ (See Appendix A for details):

$$W_{FDI} = \frac{8}{9} (1 - \alpha)^2$$ (10)

Consider, now, total discounted welfare $W_{JV}$ under a joint-venture agreement: it results from the sum of the JV joint discounted profit plus consumers’ discounted surplus (See Appendix A for details):

$$W_{JV} = \frac{3}{4}$$ (11)

**Result 3** (See Appendix A for details)

$W_{FDI} > W_{JV}$ if $0 < \alpha < \alpha_3 = 1 - \frac{3}{4} \sqrt{2}$; $W_{FDI} < W_{JV}$ if $\alpha_3 < \alpha < 1$.

According to Result 3, when the cost disadvantage $\alpha$ is low, Foreign Direct Investment is preferable for the whole society; when $\alpha$ is, instead, high, JV entails higher total welfare.

Figure 1 summarizes the main findings of Result 2 – FDI versus JV - and Result 3 – related welfare implications – for different values of the parameter $\alpha$. Since $0 < \alpha < 1$, by assumption, we restrict our attention to the white area.

Result 2 gives three possible scenarios for the entry mode choice – case i) always FDI; case ii) FDI or JV depending on the extent of the spillover effect; case iii) always JV - depending on $\theta$ being lower or greater than the two thresholds $F(\alpha)$ and $G(\alpha)$; moreover, we know that case i) never occurs for $\alpha_1 < \alpha < 1$.

Result 3 gives the condition for $W_{FDI} > W_{JV}$: total discounted welfare under FDI is greater than total discounted welfare under joint-venture if $0 < \alpha < \alpha_3$.

Since $\alpha_3 < \alpha_1$, it is clear that for $0 < \alpha < \alpha_3$, all three cases – i), ii), and iii) – are feasible, and FDI is better for the S society; for $\alpha_3 < \alpha < \alpha_1$, all three cases are feasible, as before, but JV entails higher welfare than FDI; for $\alpha_3 < \alpha < 1$, only cases ii) and iii) are feasible and JV still involves higher welfare.
3. Empirical Analysis

In this Section, we test the main findings derived above and empirically assess the choice of FDI versus joint-venture made by Italian multinationals in Asia. For the purpose of the present work, a new firm-level dataset, constructed by the author, is employed. The discussion is organized in three steps: first we present the data (3.1) and the specification (3.2), and then we comment the econometric estimates (3.3) and their matching with the theoretical priors from Section 2.

3.1 Data

The empirical analysis developed here builds on a survey questionnaire\(^{13}\) exploring the international choices of more than 300 Italian manufacturing companies with production affiliates in Asia. Although relatively small, we believe that this sample is highly representative of the Italian case, since it accounts for around 90% of all Italian investors in the region of interest\(^{14}\).

The questionnaire, based on multiple choice responses, consists of two sections: first we ask background information to derive a general profile of the Italian investors; then we investigate the Internalisation issue and the major challenges faced in the destination country, for more than 40 questions overall.

Additional balance sheet or industry-level data are derived from AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende) and ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica).

The experiences of Italian MNEs in Asia are very diverse. An initial look at the survey results suggests that it is impossible to draw a single “Italian” profile, because investors differ in many regards.

\(^{13}\) This questionnaire, designed by the author, is an updated version of Gattai (2004). Interviews have been conducted between 2001 and 2005.

\(^{14}\) The complete list of investors was obtained through intersection of all the available sources: ICE (Istituto Commercio Estero), Reprint-Politecnico, Italian Embassies and Chambers of Commerce in Asia. In lines with the theoretical specification, attention was restricted to manufacturing firms with production activity.
If we look at the number of employees, we find that medium (45%) and large (29%) companies account for the largest presence in Asia, followed by small (25%) and handcraft (6%) ones\textsuperscript{15}; according to sales, 44% of the firms top 50 million Euros, 16% is between 25 and 50 million Euros and 22% below 10 million.

\textit{Figure 2: Region of origin of the Italian parent company}

Figure 2 displays the region of origin of Italian parent companies: the largest part of respondents comes from Lombardia (37%), Emilia Romagna (16%), Veneto (14%) and Piemonte (10%) while Southern lands account for a very limited number of MNEs with manufacturing affiliates in Asia.

According to the acquisition of technology, companies can be grouped in four categories of technological development (Bell and Pavitt 1993): in traditional “supplier dominated” industries – like textile, leather, shoes, furniture, potteries etc. – technical change comes from supplier of inputs, while technology is transferred in the form of capital goods and components; in “scale intensive” industries – like automobile and chemicals – technical change is generated by the design and operation of complex production systems; in “science based” high-tech industries, technology emerges from corporate R&D and it is heavily dependant on academic research; finally, “specialized supplier dominated” firms provide high performance equipment in the form of components, instruments or software to advance users. From Figure 3, we see that Italian MNEs belong to “supplier dominated” sectors the most (37%), followed by the “specialized supplier dominated” (36%), “science based” (14%) and “scale intensive” (13%) ones.

Interviews reveal that firms pay large attention to the human capital of their employees: many of them require English (70%) and computer

\textsuperscript{15} Based on ISTAT classification, large enterprises have more than 500 employees, medium enterprises have 100-499, small and handcraft ones have 11-99 or less than 10 respectively.
(94%) skills to everybody, around 40% organizes periodic training courses longer than 6 months and the percentage of employees holding a degree is higher than 25% in 43% of the cases.

**Figure 3: Sector of the Italian parent company**

Experience in managing international operations seems high as well: many respondents have been engaged in activities abroad – from licensing (9%) to import/export (49%), from franchising to (4%) to FDI (20%) and joint-venture (18%) – in more than 5 countries (80%) and for longer than 10 years (77%) before the present involvement in Asia.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of Italian affiliates: China is the largest recipient region - accounting for 56% of FDI and JV establishments in the whole region - followed by India (17%), Malaysia (9%) and Thailand (6%), while Japan occupies the last position.

**Figure 4: Destination country in Asia**

Notice that manufacturing activities in Asia are driven by various purposes, depending on the destination. In particular, market access considerations play a major role in large countries - like China, India and Indonesia - but also in small ones - like Thailand, Singapore and
South Korea – which serve as a commercial platform to the entire Asian region (see Figure 5). At the same time, the low cost of labour provides an important rational for de-locating production in some developing countries like Vietnam, China, India and the Philippines.

Figure 5: Investors’ purpose is establishing their affiliates in Asia, by country

Adding to this, it is worth mentioning that 45% of the goods produced in Asia is intended to satisfy the local demand, while 55% is exported abroad. Evidence shows that the wish to become more competitive, a good chance, the existence of trade barriers elsewhere or special incentives to foreign activity provides further reasons to open subsidiaries.

Operating in Asia has sometimes turned out to be difficult for Italian investors whose success was eventually undermined by cultural distance (21%), language difficulties (16%), bureaucratism (16%), lack of infrastructures (11%), little transparency of the judicial system (10%), low skills of the local employees (10%) and corruption (6%). Figure 6 depicts these problems, by destination country.

As far as the Internalisation issue is concerned, joint-venture establishments (57%) prove to be the most common mode of entry for Italian companies in Asia. Nonetheless, FDI has been extensively preferred to JV in many countries, such as Singapore, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, as reported in Figure 7.

16 Using the terminology of the Knowledge Capital Model (see Markusen and Maskus 2001 for a survey), we call horizontal purpose the first case, aimed at accessing the local market – i.e. MNEs produce and sell within the local market - and vertical purpose the second one, aimed at saving on production costs – i.e. MNEs produce in the local market, because it is cheaper, but they sell abroad.
The reasons to engage in a partnership, rather than operating in wholly-owned subsidiaries, range from gaining local support (54%) to risks and costs sharing (20%), from achieving the optimal size (10%) to skills (7%) and competitive position (2%) enhancing or law restrictions (8%)\(^\text{17}\) (see Figure 8).

According to the survey, Italian companies mainly adopt a “strategic” approach (49%) to select their partner - looking at her connections, and market expertise – followed by an “organisational” criterion (20%) – based on human and learning skills - a geographical (17%) and a “financial” (14%) one (Luo 2000).

Negotiation regarding the terms of the agreement is usually a lengthy process which lasts more than one year on average and is based on the partners’ complementary skills, with the Asian firm contributing

\(^{17}\) See [www.ice.it](http://www.ice.it) and [www.indmin.nic.in](http://www.indmin.nic.in) for more details about the restrictions to foreign property in the countries of interest.
cheap labour force and deep knowledge of the local market and the MNE providing know-how and technology.

Figure 8: Reason to choose joint-venture over FDI

Among the 43% of respondents that operate in a WOS, a large majority (73%) chooses this mode in order to achieve strong control over technology transfer and high flexibility standards, in lines with our theoretical predictions: especially high tech companies are very reluctant to invest in developing countries since they do not want to share know-how with a lower skilled partner. Foreign Direct Investment seems the most natural way to avoid this risk, as MNEs simply work alone and they do not need to consult with a local counterpart on management decisions. For about 21% of the sample, the wholly-owned subsidiary represents an evolution from a former JV, while 6% chooses to operate alone due to the lack of an appropriate local partner, as reported in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Reason to choose FDI over joint-venture

3.2 Specification
Based on the data briefly reviewed in 3.1, we regress the Internalisation decision – FDI versus joint-venture – of Italian
multinationals in Asia, within the DIA framework sketched in Section 2.

Our unit of analysis is the production affiliate in Asia. The econometric specification is as follows:

\[ FDI = F \alpha + C \sigma + \varepsilon \]

\[ FDI \] is the \((n \times 1)\) dependent variable vector, whose elements take value 1 in case of wholly-owned subsidiary, 0 in case of joint-venture. Explanatory variables are of two types: \( F \) is a \((n \times m)\) matrix of firm-level regressors; \( C \) is a \((n \times k)\) matrix containing host country characteristics; \( \alpha \) and \( \sigma \) are the vectors of parameters associated to firm and country variables respectively, and \( \varepsilon \) denotes the error term.

Notice that, within \( F \), we distinguish between core and control regressors: core variables are those measuring Italian firms’ Intangible Assets\(^{18}\), over which priors have already been derived; control variables denote other firm-level characteristics that may play a role in shaping the Internalisation decision.

Recall from our previous discussion (Section 1 and 2) that knowledge covers both human capital and technological aspects, so our core firm-level regressors refer to both types. This is an important novelty, compared to the previous empirical literature: although human capital is often mentioned as a key asset, likely to orient multinational activity, to the best of our knowledge, no attempt in measuring or including it in econometric tests has been made yet. This limitation is probably due to the lack of firm-level information, which poses strict constraints to empirical studies.

As a proxy for technology, we employ alternative indicators, such as the value of patents (\( PATENT \)); the ratio of patents over sales (\( PATENT/SALES \)); and, similarly to (Blomstrom et al. 1989; Smarzynska 2000), whether or not the parent firm belongs to a high tech sector (\( HIGHTECH \)), with a particular focus on the TELECOM one\(^{19}\). To capture the role of technological leadership, the variable \( TECH_{relative} \) is also included: it measures the overall technological endowment of the parent company, relative to the industry mean (Smarzynska 2000). As far as human capital aspects are concerned, two measures are adopted: the extent of the training courses that the parent firm periodically organizes for its employees (\( TRAINING \)), and their level of education (\( GRADUATE \)).

All these variables refer to the consistency of the parent company’s Intangible Assets, so we overall expect a positive sign, basing on the model described before: according to our theoretical findings FDI,

\(^{18}\) Intangible assets, here, refer solely to knowledge – in the form of technology and human capital - as in the model described in Section 2.

\(^{19}\) Notice that in earlier studies (see, among others: Desai et al. 2002; Smarzynska 2000) R&D expenditure is also employed as a proxy for technology. Due to data missing we preferred to base on patents. However, R&D and advertising expenditures are included in \( TECH_{relative} \) (see Appendix B for details).
induced by the threat of knowledge dissipation, is more likely to emerge when know-how easily spills over – i.e. when firms are endowed with more technology and human capital or they belong to high tech industries. Moreover, our indicators of IA are characterized by a low degree of correlation, meaning that they capture different dimensions of the firms’ key resources (see table b3 in Appendix B).

Firm-level control variables include: sales (SALES, as in Blomstrom and Zejan 1991; Meyer 1998; Smarzynska 2000); the destination of the goods produced in Asia (HFDI) – which allows us to distinguish between horizontal and vertical purposes; the importance of firm-level scale economies (SCALE); a proxy for the MNE’s experience in running foreign operations (COUNTRIES, similarly to Herrmann and Datta 2002; Guillen 2003), its location in Italy (VENETO) and a few industry controls (METAL and PRECISION).

As far as country variables are concerned, we consider: TRADE, as a measure of the host market degree of openness (the same measure is employed also in Smith 2001; Arora et al. 2001; Smarzynska 2002); POP to describe the local population dimension; a property right index (PRI) and an economic freedom index (EFI), similarly to (Rapp and Rozek 1990; Maskus and Penumarti 1995; Lee and Mansfield 1996; Smarzynska 2002); and a dummy, specifying whether or not the host country belongs to the South East Asian region (SEA).

Appendix B contains more information about the variables included in the econometric specification, provides summary statistics of the continuous regressors and the correlation matrix of the core-type ones.

Given the binary nature of the dependent variable FDI, regressions are carried out within a Probit framework.

3.3 Results

Probit estimates are shown in Table 1.

Reminding the theoretical priors, derived in Section 2, it is worth noticing that all the core variables are significant with the expected sign and they remain so across different specifications; this provides a first important result and suggests quite a good matching between the theory and the data.

20 For the sake of completeness, we should mention that the role of technological leadership – captured by the variable TECH relative – is not so clear-cut. On the one hand, investors enjoying a technological lead in their respective sectors are perceived as more attractive JV partners by local firms and governments; therefore, they are more able to negotiate more favourable terms of agreement. Moreover, the technological gap between foreign leaders and domestic producers may be so large that, even in case of knowledge transfer, the threat of IA dissipation is minimal. On the other hand, the technology gap may not be enough to prevent knowledge dissipation, so investors possessing technological advantage over other firms in their sector may potentially incur in greater losses from knowledge dissipation than investors with less sophisticated technologies. Therefore, the impact of TECH relative might be positive or negative (Smarzynska 2000).

21 This evidence is also consistent with an explanation à la Antras and Helpman (2004): since foreign direct investment is a very costly mode of entry, the most
In particular, moving from the simplest specifications on the left – where FDI is regressed only on core-type variables – to the richer specifications on the right – where control variables are also included - we see that with an increase in the Italian firms’ Intangible Assets, the probability of internalising production, rather than operating in joint-venture, increases as well.

Indeed, HIGHTECH, TELECOM, PATENT, TECH_relative, PATENT/SALES, GRADUATE and TRAINING all display the expected positive sign; this means that wholly-owned subsidiaries are more likely to be settled by Italian companies operating in high tech sectors, holding patents, being technological leaders in their respective field and possessing well trained and cultured employees. These results are broadly consistent with the existing empirical literature (see, among others, Smarzynska 2000; Desai et al. 2001; Brouthers 2002; Chen and Hu 2002) and add precious information about the role of human capital, as a key resource driving the Internalisation choice of Italian companies in Asia.

As far as control variables are concerned, METAL and PRECISION turn out to be significant, with a positive sign, meaning that parent firms engaged with production of metal goods or precision instruments, watches and optical appliances have higher probability to operate through FDI. SALES is significant, as well, with a negative sign (as in Blomstrom and Zejan 1991; Meyer 1998)²², suggesting that “richer” enterprises tend to share ownership with an Asian partner, rather than operating alone. This has probably to do with the bargaining power of the Italian investor: the larger the MNE, the stronger its position in negotiating favourable JV conditions. Not surprisingly, firm-level scale economies (SCALE) encourage FDI, since the integrated solution helps to exploit the cost advantage of production on a larger scale. Estimates also show that investors coming from VENETO are more prone to operate in wholly-owned subsidiaries²³, while experience in running foreign operations (COUNTRIES) and horizontal purpose (HFDI) push towards joint-venture establishment. Indeed, being used to manage foreign operations might help to protect Intangible Assets more effectively and to avoid the risk of knowledge dissipation. At the same time, it is clear that investors wishing to penetrate the local market – horizontal purpose - are more likely to operate in joint-venture than FDI, in order to take advantage of the partner knowledge of her own country²⁴,

²² A different result is obtained in (Pan 2002; Chen and Hu 2002), where sales are shown to be positively correlated with the probability of entering a foreign market alone.
²³ We also checked the statistical significance of other regions of origin, but none of them turned out to influence the FDI/joint-venture decision.
²⁴ This is perfectly in lines with the questionnaire responses reviewed in Section 2.1: gaining local support – in terms of interacting with local authorities, marketing final products etc. - has proved to be the main reason for Italian MNEs to undertake JV projects in Asia.
Table 1: Probit estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>FDI</th>
<th>FDI</th>
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<th>FDI</th>
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<td>0.55</td>
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<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.66</td>
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<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.35</td>
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<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.68</td>
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<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 Marginal effects in round brackets, P-value in square brackets. * means significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Pseudo R² is a typical measure for goodness of fit in discrete-dependent-variable models. The expression for Pseudo R² is 1-1/{1+2(\log L_1-\log L_0)/N}, where N is the total number of observations, L_1 is the maximum log-likelyhood value of the model of interest, and L_0 the maximum value of the log-likelyhood function when all the parameters, except the intercept, are set equal to 0. P-value* denotes the P-value of the joint null-hypothesis.
whereas investors aiming at producing in Asia but exporting final goods elsewhere – vertical purpose – do not need a local counterpart and better protect their assets through WOS.

According to our data, country variables also play a role in driving the FDI-JV trade off. In particular, TRADE, EFI and PRI are significant with a positive sign, meaning that the higher the degree of openness and economic freedom and the lower the property right protection, the more appealing the integrated solution. Similar results can be found in (Pan 2002; Chen and Hu 2002; Smarzynska 2002). Notice that the size of the recipient country – measured by POP – is also significant and negative, namely larger countries tend to be accessed through joint-ventures rather than wholly-owned subsidiaries.

This is a quite plausible result, since Italian firms usually choose large host countries when driven by horizontal purposes, in which case they seek the support of a local partner. Finally, operations in South East Asian countries – captured by the dummy SEA – are more likely to be conducted via FDI than joint-venture.

4. Conclusion
Multinational Enterprises may penetrate into a foreign market through alternative channels - namely export, FDI, joint-venture and licensing - each of them involving a different degree of Intangible Assets transfer from the parent to the local firms.

While the FDI-licensing trade off has been extensively documented in the theoretical literature based on the Dissipation of Intangible Assets (see Section 1), to the best of our knowledge no theoretical treatment of the JV has been offered yet, within the DIA framework.

This paper makes an attempt at filling this gap, by means of a two-country, two-period model in which a Multinational Enterprise has to decide between two modes of servicing a foreign country S - FDI and joint-venture – each of them resulting in a different market structure for S. By assumption, Foreign Direct Investment avoids knowledge dissipation, but involves efficiency losses, since the local company has a relative advantage in input manufacturing, relative to the MNE; on the contrary, JV is efficiency enhancing, but firms retain only a share of total revenues and knowledge is subject to dissipation. In a partial equilibrium framework similar to (Ethier and Markusen 1996; Saggi 1999; Mattoo et al. 2001), we show that the joint-venture is always preferable, for the multinational, when the first period share $\theta$, imposed by the local government, is large, due to the MNE’s considerable stake in the partnership. Contrary, for low values of $\theta$, FDI always emerges since the benefit of production efficiency is more than outweighed by the low fraction of the revenues accruing to the MNE. The threat of Intangible Assets dissipation thus influences multinational activity only for intermediate values of the first period.
share, making Foreign Direct Investment prevail when the spillover effect is strong. Welfare implications of the two contractual arrangements depend on the cost disadvantage of the MNE: for low values, FDI entails higher welfare for the host country while for high values the opposite occurs. Notice that these predictions are broadly consistent with those derived for the FDI-licensing trade off (Ethier and Markusen 1996; Markusen 1998, 2001; Saggi 1996, 1999; Fosfuri 2000; Mattoo et al. 2001; Fosfuri et al. 2001; Glass and Saggi 2002a), suggesting that a similar DIA mechanism is at play here.

Our theoretical findings on the boundaries of the MNE are tested by means of a new firm-level dataset, constructed by the author through survey interviews. With a reply rate around 90% of the total, we provide evidence on more than 300 Italian firms with manufacturing affiliates in Asia, including detailed information on the human capital of the employees, beyond the firms’ technological equipment. Probit estimates show that Foreign Direct Investment is more likely to emerge when know-how easily spills over – i.e. when firms are endowed with more human capital and technology, they belong to high tech industries, or turn out to be technological leaders in their respective sector. This suggests that the Italian experience is in line with the theoretical predictions derived in Section 2 and highlights the key role of human capital aspects. We believe that this is an important novelty, compared to the previous empirical literature since, to the best of our knowledge, the impact of employee skills on the Internalisation issue has not been tested yet, due to a lack of detailed data.

Given our promising results, we believe that it is worth carrying out further research within the DIA field, future steps including the treatment of the whole array of feasible contractual arrangements - namely joint-venture, licensing, export and FDI – in a single model and the provision of further empirical evidence by means of new firm-level datasets.

5. References


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Appendix A

In Appendix A, we derive the main results shown in Section 2.

A1. MNE equilibrium profit under FDI (Equation 2)

Under FDI, the MNE and the local firm compete in a symmetric Cournot duopoly, with marginal (and average) cost equal to $\alpha$.

Each player maximizes a profit function of the type:

$$\pi^{FDI}_i = (1 - q_i - q_j - \alpha)q_i$$  \hspace{1cm} (a1)

where $i = MNE, \ local; \ j = MNE, \ local \ and \ i \neq j$. (Recall, from Equation (1), that the demand function is $p = 1 - (q_{MNE} + q_{local})$)

From the first order condition, with respect to the quantity, we find firm $i$’s best reply function:

$$q_i^*(q_j) = \frac{1 - \alpha - q_j}{2}$$  \hspace{1cm} (a2)

By symmetry, the equilibrium quantities and price are given by (a3) and (a4):

$$q_i^{FDI} = q_j^{FDI} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{3}$$  \hspace{1cm} (a3)

$$p_i^{FDI} = \frac{1 + 2\alpha}{3}$$  \hspace{1cm} (a4)

Under FDI, the Multinational Enterprise thus makes per period profit:

$$\pi^{FDI}_i = \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{9}$$  \hspace{1cm} (a5)

Considering the two-period time horizon, the present value of the MNE profit is given by:

$$\Pi^{FDI}_{MNE} = \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{9} + \frac{1}{1 + \delta} \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{9}$$  \hspace{1cm} (a6)

where $\frac{1}{1 + \delta}$ is the discount factor.

(a6) gives Equation (2), under the assumption that $\delta = 0$:

$$\Pi^{FDI}_{MNE} = \frac{2}{9} (1 - \alpha)^2$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)
A2. MNE and local firm equilibrium profits under JV (Equations 3 and 4)

Under the JV agreement, the MNE and the local firm operate within a single company, making the S market a monopoly, with zero marginal (and average) cost.

Joint profit of the two partners is:

\[ \pi^{JV} = (1 - Q)Q \]  

(a7)

Maximizing (a7), with respect to \( Q \), yields the equilibrium quantity and price:

\[ Q^{JV} = \frac{1}{2} \]  

(a8)

\[ p^{JV} = \frac{1}{2} \]  

(a9)

Joint profit \( \pi^{JV} = \frac{1}{4} \) is shared between the partners with weights \( \theta \) and \( (1- \theta) \) in the first period, \( \overline{\theta} \) and \( (1- \overline{\theta}) \) in the second one.

Therefore, the present value of the MNE profit, under JV is:

\[ \Pi_{MNE}^{JV} = \frac{\theta}{4} + \frac{1}{1 + \delta} - \frac{\overline{\theta}}{4} \]  

(a10)

which gives Equation (3), under the assumption that \( \delta = 0 \):

\[ \Pi_{MNE}^{JV} = \frac{\theta + \overline{\theta}}{4} \]  

(3)

The present value of the local firm profit, under JV is equal to:

\[ \Pi_{local}^{JV} = \frac{(1 - \theta)}{4} + \frac{1}{1 + \delta} - \frac{(1 - \overline{\theta})}{4} \]  

(a11)

This yields Equation (4) if \( \delta = 0 \):

\[ \Pi_{local}^{JV} = \frac{(1 - \theta) + (1 - \overline{\theta})}{4} \]  

(4)

A3. Local firm equilibrium profit in case of defection (Equation 5)

In this case, the local company breaks the JV contract at the end of the first period, and starts a rival firm during the second one, by means of the stolen know-how. Therefore, the present value of the local partner profit under defection - \( \Pi_{local}^{d} \) - results from two components: her first
period JV profit (see A2) plus her second period monopoly profit (since the local firm remains the only producer of final goods in S), with marginal (and average) cost $c\alpha < \alpha$, due to the spillover effect. The second period monopoly profit of the local company is:

$$\pi^d_{local} = (1 - Q - c\alpha)Q$$

(a11)

Maximizing (a11), with respect to $Q$, yields the equilibrium quantity and price:

$$Q^d = \frac{1 - c\alpha}{2}$$

(a12)

$$p^d = \frac{1 + c\alpha}{2}$$

(a13)

The second period equilibrium profit of the local company is obtained by substituting (a12) and (a13) into (a11):

$$\pi^d_{local} = \frac{(1 - c\alpha)^2}{4}$$

(a14)

By means of straightforward substitution, Equation (5) gives the present value of the local firm profit under defection ($\delta = 0$):

$$\Pi^d_{local} = \frac{(1 - \theta)}{4} + \frac{(1 - c\alpha)^2}{4}$$

(5)

A4. Proof of Result 1
Consider Equation (9), which gives the condition for the MNE to internalise, rather than partnering:

$$\frac{2}{9}(1 - \alpha)^2 > \frac{\theta}{4} + \left[1 - (1 - c\alpha)^2\right]\frac{1}{4}$$

(9)

This is equivalent to:

$$(1 - c\alpha)^2 > \frac{9\theta + 9 - 8(1 - \alpha)^2}{9}$$

(a15)

Call:
From (a16), (a17), it is clear that $c_1 < c_2$.

Solving (a15) for $c$, we find that it is verified - i.e. $\Pi_{MNE}^{FDI} > \Pi_{MNE}^{JV}$ - for $c > c_2$ or $c < c_1$.

\section*{A5. Proof of Result 2}

Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 provide useful information in order to prove Result 2.

\textbf{Lemma 1:} $c_2 > 1$, where $c_2$ is given by (a17).

\begin{align}
\text{Proof:} & \quad 1 + \frac{\sqrt{9\theta + 9 - 8(1 - \alpha)^2}}{9} \quad > 1 \\
& \quad \text{(a18)}
\end{align}

This is equivalent to:

\begin{align}
1 + \frac{\sqrt{9\theta + 9 - 8(1 - \alpha)^2}}{9} - \frac{\alpha}{\alpha} & > 0 \\
& \quad \text{(a19)}
\end{align}

Since $0 < \alpha < 1$, the Denominator of (a19) is positive, so we need to focus on the Numerator only:

\begin{align}
1 - \alpha + \frac{\sqrt{9\theta + 9 - 8(1 - \alpha)^2}}{9} & > 0 \\
& \quad \text{(a20)}
\end{align}

\text{Notice that } \frac{9\theta + 9 - 8(1 - \alpha)^2}{9} \text{ is positive for } 0 < \alpha < 1 \text{ and } 0 < \theta < 1, \text{ so } \sqrt{\frac{9\theta + 9 - 8(1 - \alpha)^2}{9}} \text{ exists and it is a real number.}
(a20) is always verified for $0 < \alpha < 1$ - it is the sum of two positive terms, $(1-\alpha)$ and the square root - so the Numerator of (a19) is positive and $c_2 > 1$.

Lemma 2: $c_1 > 1$ if $\theta < F(\alpha) = \frac{17(1-\alpha)^2 - 9}{9}$; $0 < c_1 < 1$ if $F(\alpha) < \theta < G(\alpha) = \frac{8(1-\alpha)^2}{9}$; $c_1 < 0$ if $\theta > G(\alpha)$; where $c_1$ is given by (a16).

Proof:
Consider, first, the condition for $c_1 > 0$:

$$1 - \frac{9\theta + 9 - 8(1-\alpha)^2}{9} > 0 \tag{a21}$$

Given that $0 < \alpha < 1$, the Denominator is surely positive, so we need to study only the Numerator:

$$1 - \frac{9\theta + 9 - 8(1-\alpha)^2}{9} > 0 \tag{a22}$$

which is equivalent to:

$$1 > \frac{9\theta + 9 - 8(1-\alpha)^2}{9} \tag{a23}$$

Call:

$$G(\alpha) = \frac{8(1-\alpha)^2}{9} \tag{a24}$$

Given that $0 < \alpha < 1$, it is clear that $0 < G(\alpha) < \frac{8}{9}$.

From (a23), we see that $c_1 > 0$ if $\theta < G(\alpha)$; $c_1 < 0$ if $\theta > G(\alpha)$.

Consider, now, the condition for $c_1 < 1^{27}$:

$$1 - \frac{9\theta + 9 - 8(1-\alpha)^2}{9 - \alpha} < 1 \tag{a25}$$

---

$^{27}$ If $\theta > G(\alpha)$, then $c_1 < 0 < 1$; if $\theta < G(\alpha)$, then it makes sense to check whether $c_1$ is lower or higher than 1.
This is equivalent to:

\[
1 - \alpha - \frac{\sqrt{9\theta + 9 - 8(1 - \alpha)^2}}{9} < 0
\]  
(a26)

Given that \(0<\alpha<1\), the Denominator is surely positive, so we need to study only the Numerator:

\[
1 - \alpha - \frac{\sqrt{9\theta + 9 - 8(1 - \alpha)^2}}{9} < 0
\]  
(a27)

Call:

\[
F(\alpha) = \frac{17(1 - \alpha)^2 - 9}{9}
\]  
(a28)

Given that \(0<\alpha<1\), it is clear that \(-1 < F(\alpha) < \frac{8}{9}\).

From (a27), we see that \(c_1<1\) if \(\theta>F(\alpha)\); \(c_1>1\) if \(\theta<F(\alpha)\).

Notice that \(F(\alpha)<G(\alpha)\):

\[
\frac{17(1 - \alpha)^2 - 9}{9} < \frac{8(1 - \alpha)^2}{9}
\]  
(a29)

This is equivalent to:

\[
9(1 - \alpha)^2 - 9 < 0
\]  
(a30)

which is always true for \(0<\alpha<1\).

It follows that: \(c_1>1\) if \(\theta<F(\alpha)\); \(0<c_1<1\) if \(F(\alpha) < \theta < G(\alpha)\); \(c_1<0\) if \(\theta > G(\alpha)\).

Recall from Result 1 that (9) is verified - i.e. \(\Pi_{MNE}^{FDI} > \Pi_{MNE}^{JV}\) - for \(c>c_2\) or \(c<c_1\), and combine this result with Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Recall also that \(0<c<1\), by assumption of the model.

i) If \(\theta<F(\alpha)\), then \(c_1>1\) from Lemma 2; given that \(c_1>1\) from Lemma 1, (9) is always true for \(0<\theta<1\) (See Figure a1: the horizontal line depicts values of \(c\); the bold traits indicate the interval in which (9) is true; according to the model assumption, \(c\) is defined only between 0 and 1, i.e. in the white area):
This means that – in the model range for \( c \) - Foreign Direct Investment is always preferable to joint-venture because it provides the MNE with higher profits.

\( \text{ii)} \) If \( F(\alpha) < \theta < G(\alpha) \), then \( 0 < c_1 < 1 \) from Lemma 2; given that \( c_2 > 1 \) from Lemma 1, for \( 0 < c < 1 \) (9) is verified – namely FDI entails higher profit than JV - for \( 0 < c < c_1 \) (See Figure a2):

Furthermore notice that the profit gap for the MNE, between FDI and JV \( (\Pi_{\text{FDI}}^{\text{MNE}} - \Pi_{\text{JV}}^{\text{MNE}}) \) increases as long as \( c \) decreases.

From (2), (3) and (8), we see that the profit gap equals:

\[
(\Pi_{\text{FDI}}^{\text{MNE}} - \Pi_{\text{JV}}^{\text{MNE}}) = \frac{2}{9}(1 - \alpha)^2 - \frac{\theta}{4} \left[ 1 - (1 - c\alpha)^2 \right]^\frac{1}{4}
\]  

(a31)

Now compute the derivative of \( (\Pi_{\text{FDI}}^{\text{MNE}} - \Pi_{\text{JV}}^{\text{MNE}}) \) with respect to \( c \):

\[
\frac{d(\Pi_{\text{FDI}}^{\text{MNE}} - \Pi_{\text{JV}}^{\text{MNE}})}{dc} = -\frac{1}{2}(1 - c\alpha)
\]  

(a32)

For \( 0 < \alpha < 1 \) and \( 0 < c < 1 \), (a32) is negative, namely a decrease in \( c \) (more cost reduction through knowledge spillover) increases the profit gap, for the MNE, between FDI and joint-venture.
iii) If $\theta > G (\alpha)$, then $c_1 < 0$ from Lemma 2; given that $c_2 > 1$ from Lemma 1, (9) is never true for $0 < c < 1$ (See Figure a3):

$\text{Figure a3: FDI versus JV (} c_1 < 0\text{)}$

This means that $\Pi^{FDI}_{MNE} < \Pi^{W}_{MNE}$ for $0 < c < 1$, and FDI in never chosen.  

iv) Recall from (a28) that: $-1 < F(\alpha) < \frac{8}{9}$. Case i) requires $\theta < F(\alpha)$, but $\theta$ is strictly between 0 and 1 in the model so, when $-1 < F(\alpha) < 0$, $\theta$ cannot be lower than $F(\alpha)$. What are the values of $\alpha$ such that $-1 < F(\alpha) < 0$?

\[
\frac{17(1 - \alpha)^2 - 9}{9} < 0 \quad (a33)
\]

Call:

\[
\alpha_1 \equiv 1 - \frac{3}{\sqrt{17}} > 0 \quad (a34)
\]

\[
\alpha_2 \equiv 1 + \frac{3}{\sqrt{17}} > 1 \quad (a35)
\]

Remember that $0 < \alpha < 1$: (a33) is true for $\alpha_1 < \alpha < 1$. For these values of $\alpha$, $F(\alpha) < 0$, so case i) never occurs.

A6. Total welfare under FDI (Equation 10)

Total welfare is defined as the sum of all agents’ welfare so, in our model, consumers’ welfare plus firms’ welfare.

Under FDI total per period welfare is: $w^{FDI} \equiv \pi^{FDI}_{MNE} + \pi^{FDI}_{local} + CS^{FDI}$. Recall from Section (A1) that market S is a symmetric Cournot duopoly in case of Foreign Direct Investment. As a result, the foreign and the local firms make per period profit as in (a5) – corresponding to the dotted area in Figure a4.
Given the equilibrium quantities (a3) and price (a4), consumers’ surplus $CS^{FDI}$ is represented by grey triangle in Figure a4:

**Figure a4: Total discounted welfare under FDI**

![Figure a4: Total discounted welfare under FDI](image)

In particular:

$$CS^{IV} = \frac{2}{9} (1 - \alpha)^2$$  \hspace{1cm} (a36)

Under the assumption that all agents have discount factor equal to 1, by multiplying (2) by 4 and (a36) by 2 and summing, we find total discounted welfare $W^{FDI}$ (Equation 10):

$$W^{FDI} = \frac{8}{9} (1 - \alpha)^2$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

**A7. Total welfare under JV (Equation 11)**

Recall from Section (A2) that market S is a monopoly in case of joint-venture, with the local firm being the only producer of final good. As a result, the per period total welfare $w^{JV}$ is the sum of the joint JV per period profit $\pi^{JV} = \frac{1}{4}$ - the dotted area in Figure a5 - and $CS^{JV}$ - the grey triangle in Figure a5.

Under the assumption that all agents attach equal weight to every period, we find total discounted welfare $W^{JV}$ (Equation 11):

$$W^{JV} = \frac{3}{4}$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)
A8. Proof of Result 3
To compare total discounted welfare under Foreign Direct Investment and joint-venture, we study the condition for $W_{FDI} > W_{JV}$, namely:

$$\frac{8}{9} (1 - \alpha)^2 > \frac{3}{4}$$  \hspace{1cm} (a37)

This is equivalent to:

$$(1 - \alpha)^2 > \frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{9}{8}$$  \hspace{1cm} (a38)

Call:

$$\alpha = 1 - \frac{3}{4} \sqrt{\frac{3}{2}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (a39)

$$\alpha = 1 + \frac{3}{4} \sqrt{\frac{3}{2}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (a40)

Condition (a38) is verified – meaning that $W_{FDI} > W_{JV}$ - for $\alpha < \alpha_3$ or $\alpha > \alpha_4$.

Given that $0 < \alpha < 1$, by assumption, Foreign Direct Investment brings higher welfare for $0 < \alpha < \alpha_3$, while for $\alpha_3 < \alpha < 1$ $W_{FDI} < W_{JV}$.

Appendix B
Appendix B contains a description of the variables included in econometric specification (Table b1), it provides summary statistics of
the continuous regressors (Table b2) and the correlation matrix of the core-type ones (Table b3).

Table b1: Variables description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 if FDI, 0 if JV. Type: regressand. Source: interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRADUATE</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 if the percentage of employees with a degree, in the parent firm, is larger than 25%, 0 otherwise. Type: firm-level core regressor; it is a proxy for the human capital of the parent firm. Source: interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm organizes training courses for the employees longer than 6 months, 0 otherwise. Type: firm-level core regressor; it is a proxy for the human capital of the parent firm. Source: interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHTECH</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to a “high tech” sector, i.e. a sector in which the average R&amp;D expenditure is more than 500,000 Euro. Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of technology of the parent firm. Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica) data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATENT</td>
<td>Patents of the parent firm (millions Euro). Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of technology of the parent firm. Source: AIDA (Analisi Informatizzata delle Aziende, it is a dataset that comprises balance sheet information of more than 200,000 Italian companies with sales lager than 500,000 Euro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECH_relative</td>
<td>Total value of the parent firm’s technology – R&amp;D expenditure + advertising expenditure + patents - over its industry mean. Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of technology of the parent firm; in particular it captures the role of technological leadership. Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT and AIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATENT/SALES</td>
<td>Patent over sales of the parent firm. Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of technology of the parent firm. Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT and AIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELECOM</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to the TELECOM sector, 0 otherwise. We call TELECOM the ATECO (NACE REV 1.1) 32 sector, characterized by production of TV and radio equipments. According to ISTAT, this is the manufacturing sector with largest R&amp;D investments in Italy. Type: firm-level core regressor; it is an indicator of the level of technology of the parent firm. Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METAL</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to the METAL sector, 0 otherwise. We call METAL the ATECO (NACE REV 1.1) 28 sector, characterized by production of metal goods. Type: firm-level control regressor. Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRECISION</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm belongs to the PRECISION sector, 0 otherwise. We call PRECISION the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATECO</td>
<td>(NACE REV 1.1) 33 sector, characterized by production of precision instruments, watches and optical appliances. Type: firm-level control regressor. Source: personal elaborations from ISTAT data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALES</td>
<td>Sales of the parent company (billions Euro). Type: firm-level control regressor. Source: AIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HFDI</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 in case of horizontal purpose – i.e. the goods produced in Asia are addressed to the local market – 0 in case of vertical purpose – i.e. the goods produced in Asia are exported elsewhere. Type: firm-level control regressor. Source: interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRIES</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm was engaged in international operations with more than 5 foreign countries before the FDI in Asia, 0 otherwise. It is a proxy for the firm’s experience in running foreign operations. Type: firm-level control regressor. Source: interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCALE</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 if firm-level scale economies are important for the parent firm, 0 otherwise. Type: firm-level control regressor. Source: interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VENETO</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 if the parent firm’s headquarter is located in Veneto, 0 otherwise. Type: firm-level control regressor. Source: interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Property Right Index: it scores the degree to which private property rights are protected and the degree to which the government enforces laws that protect private property. In addition, it analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. It ranges from 1 to 5, higher values associated with less protection. Type: country-level regressor. Source: Miles et al. (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFI</td>
<td>Economic Freedom Index: it measures the degree of economic freedom present in five major areas - Size of Government, Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights, Sound Money, Freedom to Trade with Foreigners, and Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business. It ranges from 0 to 10, higher values associated to more freedom. Type: country-level regressor. Source: Gwartney et al. (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP</td>
<td>Population of the host country (millions of inhabitants). Type: country-level regressor. Source: <a href="http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/">http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADE</td>
<td>Degree of openness of the host country, measured by (Import+Export)/GDP. Type: country-level regressor. Source: personal elaborations from <a href="http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/">http://humandevelopment.bu.edu/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Dummy variable, 1 if the host country belongs to the South East Asian region, i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Vietnam and Singapore, 0 otherwise. Type: country-level regressor. Source: interviews</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table b2: Summary statistics of continuous variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std.Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PATENT</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>0.6086301</td>
<td>2.012699</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.96469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECH_relative</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>3.936645</td>
<td>10.88662</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>82.71236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATENT/SALES</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>0.1761435</td>
<td>0.7417115</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.073824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALES</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>0.262313</td>
<td>0.8978276</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>6.311476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>3.491573</td>
<td>0.7817905</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFI</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>5.834098</td>
<td>0.7429829</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>9.279096</td>
<td>5.341437</td>
<td>0.435389</td>
<td>12.98848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADE</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>0.2521991</td>
<td>0.3908543</td>
<td>0.0433201</td>
<td>2.413163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table b3: Correlation matrix of the core variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GRADUATE</th>
<th>TRAINING</th>
<th>HIGHTECH</th>
<th>PATENT</th>
<th>TECH_relative</th>
<th>PATENT/SALES</th>
<th>TELECOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRADUATE</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAINING</td>
<td>0.0794</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHTECH</td>
<td>0.1090</td>
<td>0.1141</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATENT</td>
<td>0.2276</td>
<td>-0.0414</td>
<td>0.0252</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECH_relative</td>
<td>0.1875</td>
<td>-0.0090</td>
<td>-0.1426</td>
<td>0.7270</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATENT/SALES</td>
<td>0.1162</td>
<td>-0.0112</td>
<td>0.1724</td>
<td>0.6036</td>
<td>0.1054</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELECOM</td>
<td>0.1516</td>
<td>-0.0628</td>
<td>0.2133</td>
<td>-0.0420</td>
<td>-0.0664</td>
<td>-0.0019</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>