Eighth Luca d’Agliano Lecture in Development Economics

THE FUTURE OF AID

Nemat (Minouche) Shafik
Permanent Secretary
Department for International Development (DFID)

December 17th 2010
Fondazione Luigi Einaudi

The activities of the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano in Torino are supported by the

Compagnia di San Paolo
The Future of Aid

Nemat (Minouche) Shafik
Permanent Secretary, Department for International Development
The Eighth Luca d’Aglìano Lecture in Development Economics
Turin, 17 December 2010

Abstract

Aid is at a turning point. There is talk about a “triple revolution of goals, actors and tools” in the $170 billion aid industry. As much of Asia grows its way out of poverty, aid will increasingly be focused on Africa and on countries plagued by instability, or with governments unable to meet the basic needs of their populations. A growing share of aid will be directed to tackling global public goods -- like climate change, conflict prevention and public health. In future, global challenges will increasingly be addressed through coalitions that cut across states, the private sector and civil society. These networks to address poverty and global issues will increasingly become a feature of the international architecture in a multipolar world. Aid will be the catalyst for financing global problem solving. The rules of the game and the tools of development assistance need to evolve to focus on transparency, results, accountability and a market-driven division of labour for the future aid system to rise to the challenge of this new agenda.

The Pattern and Drivers of Poverty have Changed

The last decade has seen some of the fastest progress in poverty reduction seen in human history, in large part because of the rapid growth in China, India and significant parts of East Asia. Eastern Europe has successfully integrated into Europe and Latin America is both growing and beginning to address the huge inequalities that have undermined poverty reduction in the past. At a global level we are on track to achieve the goal set at the time of the millennium to halve poverty by 2015. Good policies have driven much of this success but well-designed external assistance, debt relief and the massive increase in private capital flows to emerging markets have all contributed to progress. Since 1970, average global life expectancy has risen from 59 to 70 years, school

---

1 Aid is defined as being everything in the DAC definition (Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions.) Occasionally I will use the term “aid” as a shorthand to cover all transfers of resources from richer countries to poorer ones.


3 Collier and Dollar
enrolment has grown from 55 to 70 per cent and per capita incomes have doubled to more than $10,000 in real terms.

The picture of global poverty is changing (figure 1). The proportion of people in poverty is greatest in sub-Saharan Africa (51% living on less than $1.25/day in 2005 and 60% living on less than $2/day). The greatest number of poor people today are still in China and India who have recently transitioned out of the low income category. India alone still has more poor people (456 million living on less than $1.25/day) than all of Sub-Saharan Africa (with 387 million). Over the next 20 years, presuming India and China continue to grow, about half the world’s poor will be in Sub-Saharan Africa. The remainder will be in countries that are technically middle income but with large parts of their population in poverty, often because of social exclusion, caste, race, disability or religion.

Figure 1: Percentage of Population living on less than $2 a day

In most parts of the world, aid is likely to become a much smaller share of external financing for development. Since the 1990s, (see figure 2) ODA has become less important than foreign direct investment and workers’ remittances. In future, this trend will only grow and aid dependence will fall for most countries.

Figure 2: Financial Flows into Developing Countries, IMF World Economic Outlook, 2009

---

4 2010 Human Development Report, UNDP
The most intractable poverty will be in states affected by conflict or fragility. Twenty-two of the 34 countries furthest from achieving the MDGs are either in conflict or fragile. These countries, referred to by Collier as “the Bottom Billion”, are those where incomes have stagnated as a result of the combined traps of conflict, misuse of natural resources, geographical isolation and bad governance. It is largely in these countries that 25,000 children die everyday from preventable causes. Just 47% of the world’s population live in countries affected by violence, but those countries account for 61% of the world’s impoverished people and 70% of infant deaths.

**Goals: The Development Agenda is Broader**

These shifts in poverty mean that the purpose of aid is changing. Increasingly aid will have two rationales: (1) international solidarity to help the poorest achieve a minimum standard of living, particularly in states that lack the willingness or capacity to provide it themselves and (2) solving global collective action problems (like climate change, communicable diseases, and conflict) that exacerbate poverty and have international spillovers because of globalisation and growing interdependence.

Development strategies are likely to become more ecumenical. Emerging donors will probably continue to blend aid and commercial links but this will be framed in a language of “mutual benefit” rather than mercantilism. Already many in Africa are attracted to Chinese-style state capitalism. The Government of Ethiopia gives much greater priority to achieving rapid development progress than to liberal democracy and civil society. India wants to build a social democracy and welfare state like the Nordic countries but will frame it in terms of universal rights (to work, food, education, and information) given the difficulties of targeting in a nation of over a billion people. Russia will try to spread its economic model to its neighbours using its energy wealth and pipeline network to bind its hinterland together.

More developing countries now have the capacity to shop for development models and partners. The old monopoly of the “Washington consensus” is a thing of the past. When

---

China wanted to build a public health care system, it commissioned seven different organisations to present alternative models -- the World Bank, the World Health Organisation, McKinsey and four leading Chinese think tanks. The final proposal -- an insurance based scheme that will be rolled out over the next 5 years -- reflects a mix of options that achieves universal coverage and is affordable in a Chinese context. One of the most interesting innovations in development, conditional cash transfer schemes, emerged in Mexico and Brazil and has now spread to dozens of countries across Asia and Africa. Interestingly, they too have adapted with many low income countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya opting for unconditional schemes that sustain very poor households above a minimum level of food consumption.

More countries will also begin to define development more broadly and account for it accordingly. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will remain important, especially in the poorest countries. But many countries are already beginning to look at wider issues such as environmental sustainability, equity, social capital and rights-based approaches to define their progress. Wider measures of well being such as environmental sustainability, equity and social capital will become more important and will become part of national and international measures of progress. As this occurs, more development assistance will be focussed on these wider issues.

Solving Global Collective Action Problems

By definition, globalisation fosters interdependence. Financial instability, conflict and disease spread rapidly across national borders enabled by unprecedented mobility of goods, money, people and information. Development cooperation has become a key instrument for addressing the global collective action problems that arise because of globalisation -- from agreeing norms on financial regulation to responding to global pandemics like SARs and swine flu to addressing the wider consequences of conflict or climate change. In its early days, aid was seen as something which greased the wheels of diplomacy. Increasingly, aid is becoming the key catalyst for financing global problem solving.

In terms of scale, climate change is perhaps the most important example -- both as a new driver of poverty and a global collective action problem. Nick Stern calls it “the biggest market failure” of globalisation. He notes that in terms of human consequences, the poorest countries will suffer the most because of their limited capacity to respond to the challenges. Estimates of adaptation costs range from $15 billion to $100 billion per year in 2020. Many parts of Asia and Africa face falls in agricultural productivity of up to 50% by 2080 (figure 3).

Figure 3: Impact of Climate Change on Agricultural Productivity in 2080


The High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing showed how it is possible to mobilise $100 billion/year from public and private sources to support developing countries to reduce their carbon emissions and to adapt to the adverse consequences of climate change. The debate about climate finance has focused on two contentious issues – additionality and compensation. Developing countries have argued that financing to address climate change should be additional to traditional aid since the costs are additional to those required to achieve the MDGs. Developing countries also argue for additionality on the grounds that the rich countries have developed on the back of high emissions, are responsible for climate change and have filled the world’s “carbon space”. Rich countries should therefore compensate developing countries for the damage they have caused and pay for the additional costs to them of taking more expensive low-carbon growth paths. Because this is seen as compensation (rather than aid), developing countries want the financing to go through mechanisms that they control rather than through traditional aid channels. Both the additionality and control issues are politically difficult for rich countries facing fiscal constraints and sceptical publics. The agreement at Cancun to set up a Green Climate Fund with a Board that has equal representation of developed and developing countries was rooted in the need to find a way to resolve this tension.

Conflict is another global collective action problem that is increasingly being seen as something to be addressed by development rather than military intervention alone. It is no coincidence that the parts of the world most at risk of conflict (mainly in Africa and South Asia) are also ones that are poor, have young populations and face natural resources constraints and risks (figure 4).

**Figure 4: Stress Zones** (DCDC Strategic Trends, 2007)

---

10 Reference to High Level Panel Report (insert here).
Collier calls conflict “negative development” since the average civil war leaves a country 15% poorer and if the consequences to neighbouring countries are included costs about $64 billion\(^{11}\). One civil war destroys as much as total bilateral aid to all countries. We know from work by the University of Bradford that investments in conflict prevention work. On average, a £1 investment in conflict prevention saves £4 from conflicts avoided\(^{12}\). Similarly, studies on the returns to peacekeeping have shown that UN peacekeeping operations cost much less than other forms of international interventions. For example, costs per UN peacekeeper are far lower than the cost of troops deployed by any developed states or NATO\(^{13}\). The approved peacekeeping budget for July 2009 to July 2010 is US $7.9 billion - 0.5% of global military spending.

As with conflict prevention, disaster prevention has huge returns and can avoid costs from humanitarian and environmental disasters later. China spent $3 billion on flood controls which resulted in estimated returns of $12 billion. Investments in planting mangroves to protect coastal populations in Vietnam yielded cost-benefit ratios of 50 or more\(^{14}\). As with most prevention, there is global underinvestment which needs to be redressed in the design of aid programmes.

Perhaps the most compelling evidence for a more integrated and wider approach to aid is the confluence of climate, pandemic disease and conflict risks in many of the poorest parts of the world. Unless development assistance tries to address these problems together, it is unlikely to succeed (see figure 4).

**Actors: Proliferation, Growth and Variable Geometry**

Bilateral aid is growing

---

\(^{11}\) Collier (2007) , p. 32.

\(^{12}\) Chalmers (2007), Spending to Save, Bradford University


\(^{14}\) Stern (2009) p. 68/
Despite the economic downturn, global aid has grown by 35% since 2004, both because the agenda has widened and more players have entered the industry and brought new dynamism and resources to it. Consider the situation in 1970 when the US, France and the UK alone accounted for three-quarters of official development assistance (ODA) and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD was a small club in which virtually all of aid could be coordinated. Today, there are 24 DAC members and affiliates and at least 23 other countries that give aid.\textsuperscript{15} Europe has led the way providing about two-thirds of global ODA between the EU, which has become the largest multilateral aid provider, and European member states, most of whom are committed to reaching the 0.7 of GDP target. Those commitments have had an impact -- countries with more ambitious targets have delivered more aid.\textsuperscript{16}

Figure 5, \textit{OECD/ DAC The Index of Global Philanthropy, 2009} and Kharas, 2009

While aid from DAC donors has grown to $73 billion in 2009, that of non-DAC official donors has grown from a very low base to an estimated $10 billion (figure 4). Consistent data on non-DAC donors is hard to come by and definitions are often inconsistent, so comparability is difficult. The largest amounts are probably from China, although it is very difficult to disentangle aid from export credits and foreign investment. There is also a long list of other countries building up their bilateral aid programmes – Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa. These newer donors have an approach that is in some ways more old fashioned (aid is a tool of foreign policy and pursuing commercial/mercantilist objectives) and in other ways very progressive (it is a partnership of equals based on “South-South cooperation”, not burdened by colonial history and not fraught with conditionality). As their aid programmes grow, they will change the terms of the debate about development assistance.

\textsuperscript{15} Kharas, Homi (2009), “Development Assistance in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century,” Contribution to the VII Salamanca Forum, July.

The Arab donors are a special case since they are well-established providing aid flows averaging 1.5% of GDP (more than double the UN target of 0.7 and five times the OECD average) since the 1970s after the first oil price shock. Arab aid, 90% of which comes from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE, represents 13% of DAC ODA and nearly three-quarters of non-DAC ODA. Arab aid is untied, tends to be very country-led, highly concessional, inversely correlated with the oil price, and not burdened by conditionality. Arab donors are highly harmonised with each other, but less so with other donors, although this is evolving with greater collaboration with DAC donors.\footnote{In recent years, Arab donors have widened their geographical focus beyond neighbouring and Muslim countries and have broadened their sectoral focus beyond infrastructure. For further details, see World Bank (2010), “Arab Development Assistance: Four Decades of Cooperation,” Washington DC.}

**Multilateralism alongside Minilateralism**

The multilateral system too has grown to $28 billion in 2009, although there is less universalism and more “minilateralism” – small groups of countries partnering to create an institution to address a particular issue or set of issues.\footnote{Naim, Moises (2009), “Minilateralism: the magic Number to Get Real International Action,” Foreign Policy, July/August.} Kharas (2009) estimates that there are over 263 multilateral aid agencies including the major development banks, the UN system (which now provides only 4% of global ODA), and a large number of specialised funds, often delivering aid around a set of narrower development objectives (like HIV, vaccines, or disaster prevention). In addition, there are a large number of informal groupings such as the various “G clubs” (G8, G20, G22, the BASIC group, etc) that operate alongside the formal multilaterals but can have a major impact on global decision-making.

The share of global aid going to the more universalist institutions with wide global membership – like the UN and the World Bank – has declined to be supplanted by the growth of more specialised institutions such as the Global Fund to Fight Aids, TB and Malaria and networks like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Rischard argues that these “global issues networks” provide an important addition to global governance and problem-solving that has the advantage of speed, flexibility and legitimacy.\footnote{Rischard, Jean-Francois (2002), High Noon: Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them, Basic Books.} Initially some of these global or “vertical” programmes were about coordination and standard setting, but they are increasingly about delivering results by directing funding through developing country governments or other development agencies. They have also increasingly served as a way to include non-official donors, such as the foundations and corporations, in common endeavours.

The international architecture is not a product of “intelligent design” but instead is evolutionary. The evolution over the last decade of this wider array of minilateral institutions reflects frustration with the effectiveness, legitimacy and pace of delivery in many of the multilaterals. As objectives diverge, more countries are choosing not to compromise through multilateral governance structures.\footnote{Powell, Andrew and Matteo Bobba (2006), “Multilateral Intermediation of Development Assistance: What is the Trade-off for Donor Countries?” InterAmerican Development Bank Working Paper, June.} They have also increased the pressure on multilaterals to reform their governance and modes of operation if they are to remain important for solving global problems (hence the massive effort to reform the governance of the IMF and the World Bank and the ongoing debate about Security Council reform).
Over time, money and influence have drifted toward the more effective parts of the multilateral system. Many poorly performing agencies have seen funding levels stagnate in recent years as donors have increasingly focused their resources on those that are better at delivering and accounting for results. Several donors have conducted reviews of the multilateral system; the UK is increasingly linking funding decisions to performance including allowing good performing agencies to secure additional funding if they meet certain targets.  

Private Philanthropy and Civil Society

There are no reliable estimates of private giving to development causes but one recent estimate it to be $49 billion a year and possibly as high as $60 billion. The largest is the Gates Foundation with a total asset trust endowment of $36.4 billion and annual disbursements of $3-4 billion. But the fastest growing part of the sector are the numerous small foundations that are expanding in every part of the world.

Similarly, there is no reliable estimate of the number or scale of civil society or faith based organisations that support development causes. They easily number into the millions of organisations. They vary in scale to those run by individuals to the modern international NGOs that are organised like multi-national corporations with strong global centres and many national affiliates that operate on an international scale.

Modern Global Governance is Networked

So how does this new web of aid come together? A good example is the MDG Summit in New York in September 2010. Increasingly these global events operate in two parallel universes. There is the traditional multilateral part at which heads of state from donor countries read prepared statements about their official aid and those from developing countries describe their needs. But alongside this, networked minilateralism is in full swing in a variety of parallel events that mix Ministers, civil society, corporations, private philanthropists and celebrities.

This is illustrated by an event that the UN Secretary General hosted on 22 September 2010 on maternal and child health – two key milennial development goals that are off-track. The “Summary of Commitments” documents more than $40 billion of promises over a five year period to improve maternal and child health. It is striking in a number of respects:

- For the thirty-five countries in attendance, the resources and policy commitments announced by developing countries were as substantial as those presented by rich countries. For example, Bangladesh committed to doubling the percentage of births attending by skilled health workers from 24.4% through training an additional 3000 midwives and upgrading 59 district hospitals and 70 mother and child welfare centres. Ethiopia committed to a four-fold increase in midwives with the objective to reduce maternal mortality from 590 per 100,000 to 267 and under-five mortality from 101 to 68 by 2015.

---

21 In the past DFID has used performance-based financing for WHO, UNICEF, UNAIDS, UNDP and UNFPA (working with the Danes on UNDP and UNFPA).
22 Hudson Institute (2009), Index of Global Philanthropy, Washington DC.
23 Green, Mike and Matthew Bishop (2009), Philanthrocapitalism, London: AC Black.
Fifty-four civil society organisations also made commitments. The foundations
promises ranged in size from $1.5 billion from the Gates Foundation to $5 million
from a local Nigerian Foundation. Major civil society organisations like CARE and
Save the Children made large financial commitments ($1.8 billion and $500 million
respectively over a 5 year period), but many smaller NGOs made commitments
around advocacy, standard-setting, and lobbying for legislation.

Private sector offers were also substantial. Merck committed $840 million over 5
years for HIV prevention and treatment, childhood asthma programmes, and
donations of a vaccine for human papaloma virus. Johnson and Johnson donated
200 million doses of treatment for intestinal worms in children, a major cause of
poor school attendance. The Body Shop initiated a $2.25 million programme to
stop sex trafficking of children in 60 countries.

The multilaterals (WHO, GAVI, Global Fund, UNICEF, UNAIDS and the World
Bank) focused on providing a coordinated mechanism/platform for delivering
common objectives.

In addition, a large number of associations, such as the International Confederation
of Midwives and the International Paediatric Association, endorsed the programme
of action and committed to have their members support it.

This is what modern global governance looks like -- a coalition of multilateral institutions,
national governments, civil society and the private sector coalescing around issues of
common concern. As the power of national governments declines, the importance of such
networks and alliances will only grow. Will such a fluid and dynamic structure deliver
better outcomes? Only if some of the ways of working in the aid industry change.

Rules and Tools: We need New Ones

Aid will continue to increase in the long run, even though it will be a declining share of total
flows to developing countries. The delivery of aid will be increasingly fragmented, using
multiple delivery channels with various combinations of donors and recipients -
government, private foundations, corporations, civil society, and individuals. These will
create a complex web of networks and alliances to achieve various objectives.

There are several risks to this new world of aid. Fenglar and Kharas (2010) identify the
risk of growing fragmentation as more and smaller donors enter the aid market. In 1996,
there were 17,102 aid projects registered with the OECD DAC; in 2008 that number was
99,376. The average size of each activity fell over the same period from $2.92 million to
$1.59 million.24 The administrative burden is huge – they estimate that official donors sent
more than 30,000 missions to developing countries to manage aid projects. Coordination
costs for developing countries are vast. Weak institutions are burdened or have good staff
poached from them by donors. The examples are well documented and widespread.25

Many developing countries have greater capacity to shop for and manage development
partners. This is a positive thing – but they need to be given the tools to do this well.
There are three elements to this: (1) new rules around transparency, benchmarking and
independent evaluation; (2) new tools that deliver results and flexible financing especially

24 Fenglar, Wolfgang and Homi Kharas (2010), Delivering Aid Differently, unpublished manuscript.
25 For more examples, see Bardar, Owen, Simon Maxwell, Mikaela Gavas, and Deborah Jackson (20xx),
"The Governance of the Aid System and the Role of the EU," mimeograph (check).
for global public goods; and (3) a division of labour driven by “market-like” forces or a “collaborative market” in the aid industry.

New rules

For such a large and fragmented aid industry to work, there is a need for much greater information, freely available, to allow participants (donors and aid recipients, especially citizens) to coordinate, plan and implement more effectively. Transparency is starting to take hold in the official aid industry, albeit slowly. The International Aid Transparency Initiative is a good example, where 18 donors have agreed to publish information on their activities based on a common reporting format, allowing them to be quickly and easily compared and held more readily to account\(^{26}\). The UK has launched a Transparency Guarantee, committing to publish comprehensive and comparable information on all development spending, which is accessible to citizens in the UK and overseas.

Transparency needs to spread to other parts of the industry, including civil society, emerging donors and the private philanthropies and corporate sector. Many of them have been reluctant, but clearly they are the new frontier for the transparency agenda. Inevitably, money will flow to the better performing agencies in the system (so it should be no surprise that the poorly performing ones are the most resistant to transparency)\(^{27}\).

Transparency enables a wide variety of analysts across the world to begin to benchmark different agencies which can then drive improvements in performance. These analytical intermediaries are essential for transparency to have an impact, especially in developing countries where there is less capacity. An interesting example is an assessment of aid quality by Birdsall and Kharas which looks at 30 performance indicators for 23 countries and selected multilaterals\(^{28}\). This can be complemented by growing independent evaluation, including impact evaluations based on randomised trials, that enable the aid industry to learn more systematically from experience. Most importantly, transparency will enable citizens in developing countries to hold governments to account, to exercise their rights and to have greater control over decisions that affect their lives.

Better Tools

If donors continue to use old-fashioned aid tools such as projects, project implementation units, foreign consultants, and accountability to foreign capitals, this new aid architecture will collapse under its own weight and ineffectiveness. New tools are needed that encourage pooling of resources, clarity on results, using more local capacity, and greater transparency and accountability especially to beneficiaries. These more modern tools of development have to move from being interesting innovations, to become a much bigger share of development activity.

There are many good examples of more modern tools currently in operation. Severino cites the example of the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest which brings together all

\(^{26}\) For more details, see [http://www.aidtransparency.net/](http://www.aidtransparency.net/). It is important to note that there have been several other attempts to coordinate data on aid. “AIDA” was an early effort by the World Bank to get coordinated reporting on aid activities through its Development Gateway (see AidData.org). Most of these efforts have had difficulty sustaining input and keeping information current.

\(^{27}\) For example, DFID has used delivery of results to allocate its aid across countries and the multilateral system for the first time this year.

the major actors in the microfinance industry (donors, banks, NGOs, etc.) to agree on common standards, invest in new products, report transparently on financial performance, and build market infrastructure like rating agencies and accounting tools to enable the industry to grow. Many donors (including DFID) are experimenting with results-based financing. The World Bank has run a series of “output-based aid” programmes that contract private providers for water supply or health services based on outputs. DFID is funding several large results based financing schemes in health, education, water and sanitation through the World Bank and other organisations. DFID is experimenting with results based approaches in health in Uganda, and in climate change in Nepal and India. We are piloting for the first time Cash-on-Delivery Aid in the education sector in Ethiopia.

New technologies also enable new models for delivering aid. The rise in person-to-person technologies via the internet has shortened the accountability chain between taxpayers/citizens in rich countries with beneficiaries in poor countries. It is now possible for private individuals to select beneficiaries in poor countries and to give them a grant or a loan while having an independent agency monitor progress. Smart cards have made it possible to provide financial services and cash transfers to isolated communities where it would have been inconceivable to provide branch banking in the past. Institutional links between rich and poor countries – through businesses, hospitals, schools and universities – will grow reflecting the desire of many people in better off countries to engage with the developing world.

Financial innovations have also changed the landscape for mobilising resources from the private sector and citizens. The International Finance Facility for Immunisation used bond markets to front-load funding for immunisation and has successfully mobilised $3 billion. The voluntary tax on airline tickets funds 72% of UNITAID’s $600million annual budget, which contributes to scaling up access for treatment of HIV, tuberculosis and malaria in developing countries. Flexible mechanisms that finance both public sector and private sector financing have been necessary to address the challenge of climate change. The Climate Investment Funds, Clean Technology Fund, Adaptation Fund, Clean Development Mechanism, and the new Green Fund agreed in Cancun reflect the need to provide multiple financing windows to meet the preferences of different donors, recipients and investors.

**Division of Labour**

The aid industry has tried to improve its division of labour for over a decade. The “Paris Declaration” followed by the “Accra Agenda” were valiant attempts to harmonise ways of working that would improve the effectiveness of aid. The European Union also tried to agree a division of labour at country level with every member state agreeing to limit the number of sectors in which it would be active. These efforts have not been able to keep up with the growth of the industry and the proliferation of players – a new model for increasing effectiveness and rationalising the industry is needed.

---

29 In the interests of transparency, I should reveal that I chaired CGAP from 2000-2004. But the praise for the CGAP model comes from Severino and Ray (2009).
31 See, for example, Kiva.org.
Given the growing scale, it is more likely that competition, rather than coordination, will drive improvement. Transparency and pressure to deliver results will mean that more donors will have to focus on their comparative advantage. A more competitive aid market will need rigorous testing of new ideas, freedom to experiment and to fail, and mechanisms for learning and improving. Bardar argues for a “collaborative market” where proliferation forces greater specialisation among donors.\(^{34}\) This will have to emerge over time since it would be impossible to negotiate a clear division of labour. But the logic of comparative advantage and available instruments could drive a process whereby more donors find their competitive niche.

One illustrative division of labour that focuses on the unique characteristics of different actors might look like the following:

**United Nations** No other organisation has the legitimacy that comes from universal membership. This makes the UN uniquely placed to be the leading agency on politically sensitive issues like conflict, peace and security, humanitarian matters, peacekeeping and peace-building. In those contexts where national governments are often weak, the UN has to play an important role in coordinating the activities of international actors (such as through the cluster system in humanitarian crises). Its universal membership also makes it an ideal place to agree many global norms and standards (maritime rules, global health standards, etc.).

**World Bank and the Regional Development Banks** The international financial institutions are best positioned to lead on large scale development finance in states that can afford to borrow and have the capacity to manage programmes on their own. They could be the major source (along with private capital markets) of funding for middle income countries with major poverty issues (such as India, Brazil, Indonesia) as well as well-performing low-income countries (Ghana, Vietnam, Tanzania).

**Bilateral Agencies** Grant financing will remain important to supporting delivery of basic social services in many low income countries for many years ahead. Bilateral donors who face strong taxpayer pressure to deliver tangible results have a comparative advantage in funding education and health services in the poorest countries, particularly in fragile states where they can work alongside the UN. For now, new bilateral donors are likely to focus on aid financing facilitation of commercial links and technical assistance (such as China’s tradition of sending doctors to Africa or Brazil’s sharing of its experience on treating HIV or managing cash transfers) where their recent experience is often more relevant to its partners. Most bilateral agencies will be the repository of national support for global problem solving.

**Foundations** Private philanthropists can afford to take risks that public funders cannot. They have a huge comparative advantage in being the “venture capitalists” who invest in development innovation. This can include technology (such as the Gates Foundation’s investments in new vaccines) but can also include innovations in delivery mechanisms, accountability, and programme design.

**Civil Society** In all countries, civil society groups have a unique role to play in holding governments and increasingly the private sector to account. In many contexts they empower disadvantaged groups to demand and exercise their rights. They also deliver

\(^{34}\) Bardar, Owen (2010), “Could donor proliferation lead to better aid?” owen.org blog, November 23.
essential services where states cannot operate our where governments choose to delivery services through them.

**What will the future look like?**

This paper is not meant to be predictive – it is intended to challenge current thinking about what is possible given current global trends. Some of these trends seem very clear. Flows of development finance from richer countries to poorer ones will only grow in the years ahead. In addition to financing poverty reduction, they will increasingly be about addressing global public goods. These flows will move through a complex web of national, international, private and public channels that will move and evolve depending on the issue at hand.

In the years ahead, the world has an opportunity to redefine the rules, tools and division of labour that governs aid. By the time the MDG target date of 2015 is reached, the world will need to coalesce around a new framework for thinking about development. It is imperative that we use that time to agree a new set of principles around the objectives and modalities of aid if this more complex industry is to be fit to address the global challenges of our time – peace, poverty and environmental sustainability.